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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
BYRON C. MUNSEE, 
Plaintiff and Appelrtlnt, 
vs. Case No. 9351 
EDNA MUNSEE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF. OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This brief is submitted pursuant to and in behalf of 
an appeal taken by the above named Appellant from that 
Order of the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
of the State of Utah, on the 12th day of September, 1960, 
dismissing the Complaint for Divorce theretofore filed by 
the Appellant on the 8th day of July, 1960. The evidence 
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upon which the Order of the Third District Court was 
predicated is scarce and this appeal is directed to questions 
of law only. However, it is deemed significant to set forth 
in brief, the nature of the case together with those eviden-
tiary matters which this Appellant will establish in con-
nection with the points of law under consideration. 
The Appellant and the Respondent were joined to-
gether by marriage contract on March 10, 1958, in Phoe-
nix, Arizona. Prior to that time the Appellant was educat-
ed in the Public School System of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and was graduated from West High School therein on June 
6, 1953. The Appellant entered the service of the United 
States Air Force in January, 1954, and was stationed and 
based without the State of Utah during his tour of duty 
and until his release from the service in October, 1957. 
Upon his discharge, the Appellant returned to Salt Lake 
City, Utah and resided there until December, 1957, at 
which time he sought employment in Phoenix, Arizona. 
After having married the Respondent in March of 1958, 
the Appellant and Respondent returned to Salt Lake City, 
Utah in the first part of June, 1958, wherein he was gain-
fully employed for a period of four months until he again 
entered the services of the United States Air Force on the 
16th day of October, 195-8. Subsequent to that date, the 
Appellant was ordered and assigned to Travis Air Force 
Base in the State of California and was so stationed at 
the time of the filing of the Complaint herein, in July of 
1960. The Appellant, as an enlisted member of the United 
States Air Force, maintains his quarters at Travis Air 
Force Base, California. The records of the Utah State Tax 
Commission indicate that the Appellant filed State income 
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tax returns for the years 1958 and 1959, and the records 
of the Clerk of Salt Lake County, Utah, reveal that the 
Appellant cast an absentee vote in Salt Lake County in the 
General Election of 1960. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TERM "RESIDENCE," AS USED IN 30-3-1 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, PRESCRIBES 
A FINDING OF "DOMICILE," AND DOMICILE 
IS THE BASIC TEST FOR JURISDICTION OF 
COURTS TO HEAR AND DETERMINE DI-
VORCE LITIGATION IN THE. STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT, AFTER HAVING ENTERED 
THE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND HAVING BE.EN 
STATIONED AT AN AIR FORCE BASE IN CAL-
IFORNIA, RETAINED HIS DOMICILE IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
a. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDIC-
TION, THEREFORE, TO HEAR AND DE-
TERMINE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT 
FOR DIVORCE. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISS-
ING THE COMPLAINT OF APPELLANT FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, WITHOUT HAVING HEARD AND RE-
CEIVED EVIDENCE. RELATIVE TO AND IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE DOMICILIARY STA-
TUS OF THE APPELLANT. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TERM "RESIDENCE," AS USED IN 30-3-1 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, PRESCRIBES 
A FINDING OF "DOMICILE," AND DOMICILE 
IS THE BASIC TEST FOR JURISDICTION OF 
COURTS TO HEAR AND DETERMINE DI-
VORCE LITIGATION IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The jurisdictional basis of a claim for relief in di-
vorce is a matter which is dependent on legislative dec-
laration, and the legislature of the State of Utah has said 
that residency of the complainant within the State shall 
be a prerequisite to a valid proceeding. 30-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, 
provides in part: 
"* * * and the court may decree a dissolution of 
the marriage contract between the plaintiff and 
defendant in all cases where the plaintiff shall have 
been an actual and bona fide resident of this state 
and of the county where the action is brought for 
three months next prior to the commencement of 
the action,* * * ." 
There is a variety of ways to define the term "residency" 
and its usage will vary under the law, with the type of 
conduct under consideration. It can safely be said, how-
ever, that with respect to jurisdiction of courts in pro-
ceedings of divorce, it refers to the domicile of the plaintiff. 
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 
L.Ed. 279; Ungemach v. Ungemach, 61 Cal. App. 2d 29, 
142 P.2d 99; Reubelmann v. Ruebelmann, 38 Ida. 159, 220 
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P. 404; Hampshire v. Hampshire, 70 Ida. 522, 223 P.2d. 
950, 21 A.L.R. 2d 1159; Thomas v. Newell, 277 Ky. 712, 127 
S.W. 2d. 610; Schwallbach, v. Schwallbach, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 
345; Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 194 Misc. 505, 87 N.Y. 
S.2d 866. 
Indeed, this interpretation was sustained by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 
1055, wherein Wolfe, J., writing for the Court, set forth 
the public policy involved in the test of domicile and in so 
doing, quoted approvingly from State v. Williams, 224 
N.C. 183, 29 S.E. 2d 744, 750, (prologue to the land mark 
decision of Williams v. North Carolina, supra): 
"In Andrews v. Andrews, supra (188 U.S. 14, 23 S. 
Ct. 237, 47 L. Ed. 366) it was said that in divorce 
actions, domicile is the inherent element upon 
which jurisdiction must rest, whether the proceed-
ing be ex parte or inter partes. Where one's domi-
cil is, there will his marital status be also. The mar-
riage relation is interwoven with public policy to 
such an extent that it is dissolvable only by the law 
of the domicil. So the domicilary state, and no 
other, furnishes the proper forum for valid pro-
ceedings.* * *" 
The domiciliary concept for jurisdiction of courts in Utah 
was further cemented in Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 
496, 222 P.2d. 105·5. 
Of the several types of domicile which may obtain to 
the individual at different periods, reference is had in the 
case at bar only to the domicile established by choice, in 
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other words, the locus where the individual has resided 
voluntarily, with the intent of remaining there for an 
unlimited period of time. 
Domicile of choice is composed and constituted of two 
principle elements: 
( 1) Physical presence within the territory. 
(2) Intent to remain within said territory for an 
indefinite period of time. 
Stated another way, it is the place to which an individual, 
while absent, intends to return and from which he has 
no intention to leave permanently. Williamson v. Osenton, 
232 U. S. 619, 34 S.Ct. 442, 58 L. Ed. 758; Hampshire v. 
Hampshire, supra. 
A domicile may be lost in one state and acquired in a 
second state but only if both the ingredients of physical 
presence in the second state coupled with the intent to 
remain there permanently, or at least for an indefinite 
period, are present. Gardner v. Gardner, supra. Mere ab-
sence from a state, without the corresponding intent to 
remain away therefrom indefinitely is insufficient to work 
a change of the individual's domicile. The Supreme Court 
of Iowa observed in Harris v. Harris, 205 Iowa 108, 215 
N.W. 661: 
:'* * ~A chang~ ?f re~idence does not consist solely 
In gmng and living In another place, but it must 
be with the intent of making that place a perma-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
nent residence. The temporary absence from the 
state of one domiciled there will not be held a 
change of residence, unless to the fact of residence 
elsewhere be added animus manendi, * * *" 
This principle is echoed by the American Law Institute 
in its Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, page 36. 
The statement is not prone to challenge that the great 
weight of authority in the courts of this country supports 
the rule that the criterion for divorce jurisdiction is found-
ed upon the domicile of the plaintiff within state wherein 
the action is laid. Brandt v. Brandt, 76 Ariz. 154, 261 P.2d 
978; Roberts v. Roberts, 81 C.A. 2d 871, 185 P.2d 381; 
Crouch v. Crouch, 28 C. 2d 243, 169 P.2d 897; Rodda v Rod-
da, 185 Ore. 140, 200 P.2d 616. The fact that 30-3-1 U.C.A., 
1953, sets forth that the plaintiff shall be an "actual and 
bona fide resident" of the state and county for three 
months next preceding the commencement of the action 
does not effect the primary test of domicile. Weiss v. Weiss, 
supra; Gardner v. Gardner, supra. As an illustration, the 
laws of the State of Idaho require that the person filing a 
complaint for divorce shall actually have been a resident 
of Idaho for six weeks preceding the commencement of 
the action. Yet in Hampshire v. Hampshire, supra, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held: 
"To constitute a residence within the meaning of 
the divorce statute, there must be a habitation or 
abode in a particular place, for the required time, 
and an intention to remain there permanently or 
indefinitely. * * * Citing authorities" 
"Residency" as used in this statute, has reference to, im-
plies and signifies "domicile" in the classic sense .. 
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The facts sought to be established in the case at bar 
are to the effect that the Appellant had established, prior 
to his entry into the United States Air Force, and does 
now maintain a domicile in the State of Utah and Salt 
Lake County, and further, that the Appellant has never 
established a new domicile without the State of Utah; this 
State was and is now his permanent place of residence, 
both in the generic sense and in the technical context of 
30-3-1, U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT, AFTER HAVING ENTERED 
THE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND HAVING BEEN 
STATIONED AT AN AIR FORCE BASE IN CAL-
IFORNIA, RETAINED HIS DOMICILE IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
a. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDIC-
TION, THEREFORE, TO HEAR AND DE-
TERMINE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT 
FOR DIVORCE. 
On th 16th day of October, 1958, Appellant entered the 
Armed Forces of the United States and was ordered to 
report for duty at Travis Air Force Base in the State of 
California. Prior to that point of time, Airman Munsee 
had resided at Salt Lake City for a period of three and 
one-half months. In applying the traditional tests to de-
termine the domicile of the appellant while in the seTvice 
of the United States, it becomes perfectly apparent that 
domicile must rest in the State wherein he resided prior 
to his entrance into the Armed Forces. An essential ele-
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ment of domicile (the formulation of intent to remain in 
the political territory or the capacity to form such intent) 
is absolutely lacking. Allen v. Allen, 52 N.M. 174, 194 P.2d 
270. A member of the military service, stationed at an air 
base in a particular state, is subject to the jurisdiction and 
control of the military commander; his physical presence 
within or without a state is dependent not upon his pleas-
ure, but upon the decision of the appropriate military 
authority. The time does not exist when such an individ-
ual may exercise a choice as to the locale in which he shall 
reside. 
It has been thus accurately stated that the domicile 
of a serviceman remains unchanged by his temporary duty 
and absence outside the domiciliary locus formerly estab-
lished, even if it be for a period of years. Kankelborg v. 
Kankelborg, 199 Wash. 259, 90 P.2d 1018; Harris v. Harris, 
205 Iowa 108, 215· N.W. 661; Johnson v. Benton, 73 Cal. 
App. 565, 239 P. 60; 28 C.J.S. 28, Domicile #12g(1); 17 
Am. Jur. 470, Divorce and Separation #297. A host of 
decisions in this country are in accord with the rule that 
an individual in the service of the United States Armed 
Forces retains his domicile or residence in the state where-
in he resided prior to entrance into the service, and the 
courts of the latter state may exercise jurisdiction over 
a suit for divorce maintained by the serviceman even 
though his physical presence is at a military station in a 
sister state. Buck v. Britt, 187 Misc. 217, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 4'79; 
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 162 Pa. Super. 22, 56 A.2d 362; Wal-
cup v. Honish, 210 La. 843, 28 So.2d 452. In Stevens v. 
Allen, 139 La. 658, 71 So. 936 plaintiff at the age of 18 
years and while domiciled in Louisiana, was appointed a 
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cadet in the Military Academy at West Point. After 30 
years of continuous service in the Army and being sta-
tioned in all sections of the United States, he brought suit 
for divorce in Louisiana. The Louisiana Supreme Court 
held that the legal domicile or residence of the plaintiff 
was never lost, and thus, the Courts of Louisiana had jur-
isdiction to hear, determine and grant a divorce, binding 
and valid in nature. A similar result was reached in State 
v. Foster, 44 Del. 384, 57 A.2d 58. An army officer in Har-
ris v. Harris, supra, brought an action for divorce in Iowa. 
He had resided during his minority in Des Moines, had 
accepted an appointment and graduated from West Point 
and was thereafter ordered to several military posts, all 
without the State of Iowa. In construing the Iowa Code 
(requiring a bona fide residence in the state), the Iowa 
Court found that the officer had retained his domiciliary 
status in Iowa. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in ruling on a case 
of similar import to the case at bar, Means v. Means, 145 
Neb. 441, 17 N.W. 2d 1, had this to say: 
"* * * The residence or domicile of a person in the 
military or naval service of his country is in no 
way affected by such service. He does not abandon 
or lose the residence he had when he entered such 
service, for his various locations while in the serv-
ice are fixed by the will of other superiors to him 
in rank. * * * In the case at bar it is clear * * * 
that plaintiff's service in the army, and his tem-
porary abode a~ various ar:ny camps, did not in any 
way change his legal residence, which was at all 
times in Omaha, Nebraska. * * *" 
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Other decisions supporting this rule are Zimmerman v. 
Zimmerman, 175 Ore. 585, 155 P.2d 293; Johnson v. Ben-
ton, supra; Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 198 A. 154; Knol-
ton v. Knolton, 155 III. 158, 39 N.E. 595. 
The appellant would not submit that a domicile may 
not be established in the State wherein he is assigned by 
the military commander, for the authorities indicate that 
such may be accomplished, if clear, convincing and un-
equivocal evidence of such fact is adduced. Gallagher v. 
Gallagher, 214 S.W. 516 (Tex. Civ. App.); Zimmerman v. 
Zimmerman, supra; Harris v. Harris, supra. However there 
exists a presumption in favor of the proposition that the 
domicile of a serviceman remains constant in the jurisdic-
tion wherein it was founded before service in the military 
commenced. Montague v. Montague, 68 N.Y.S. 2d 185. Not 
one scintilla of evidentiary proof was brought forth by the 
respondent in the lower court in the instant case to indi-
cate that the domicile of the appellant was in a state other 
than Utah. 
It is fruitful to note specific legislation in connection 
with the status of a member of the armed services in re-
lation to his residence or domicile in the jurisdiction where 
he formerly resided prior to his active service in the mil-
itary. The legislature of the State of Utah has provided 
that, at least for the requirements of voting, an individual 
shall not be deemed to have lost his residence by reason 
of service in the United States Armed Forces without the 
State. 20-2-14 (2) U.C.A. 1953. It would be well to add to 
this, the expressed intent of the United States Congress 
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'vith respect to members of the Armed Forces, that for 
purposes of taxation, 
"* * * a person shall not be deemed to ~ave lost a 
residence or domicile in any State, Territory, pos-
session, or political subdivision * * * sole.ly by re~s­
on of being absent therefrom in comphance Wlth 
military or naval orders, or to have acquired a 
residence or domicile in * * * any other State * * * 
while, and solely by reason of being, so absent." 
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 
U.S.C.A. #574. 
Generally speaking, the courts of the domicile of the serv-
iceman are the sole tribunals with sufficient interest in 
his marital contract to hear and recognize a complaint for 
divorce. The reason for this is true that there is no mini-
mum contact between the serviceman and the state where-
in he is temporarily stationed which would seTve as a 
catalyst upon which to establish jurisdiction over the sta-
tus of the marriage. Conversely the failure of the courts 
of the former domicile of the serviceman to exercise jur-
isdiction over the merits of the claim might well leave 
him without a forum in which to determine the validity 
of the allegations in his complaint. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISS-
ING THE COMPLAINT OF APPELLANT FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, WITHOurr HAVING HEARD AND RE-
CEIVED EVIDENCE RELATIVE TO AND IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE DOMICILIARY STA-
TUS OF THE APPELLANT. 
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Although the law to be applied with respect to juris-
diction of courts in matters of divorce is believed to be as 
herein set forth, it is submitted that a determination of 
domicile is, in the final analysis, one of law to be predi-
cated upon the evidence. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 
supra. 
The record of the lower Court in the immediate situa-
tion was absolutely devoid of testimony or evidence upon 
which to base the order from which this appeal is di-
rected. Actually, the only thing before the District Court 
was the pleading of the Appellant in which residency was 
alleged, together with the motion of the Respondent; it 
was reversible error for the lower Court to dismiss the 
complaint of Appel1ant without affording him the oppor-
tunity of presenting evidence relative to the jurisdictional 
allegations, unless as a matter of law, the complaint on 
its face, negates jurisdiction to determine the validity of 
the facts set forth therein. 
As to this matter, it is respectfully submitted that the 
authorities, including the decisions of this Court, well 
establish the rule to be that a member of the United States 
Air Force retains his domicile or residence in the state 
wherein he resided prior to entry into the service and 
that the Courts of the latter state have jurisdiction to hear 
and determine a suit for divorce prosecuted by the service-
man therein, unless it is shown that he has affirmatively 
established a new domicile in a sister state. 
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CONCLUSION 
The order of the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District, State of Utah, dismissing the Appellant's Com-
plaint of divorce should be reversed and Appellant should 
be allowed and permitted to proceed before the lower 
Court in the trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted 
JED W. SHIELDS, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
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